Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 51
Issue 3 May 2018

Article 8

2018

Humanitarian Regulation of Hostiles: The Decisive Element of
Context
Geoffrey S. Corn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Geoffrey S. Corn, Humanitarian Regulation of Hostiles: The Decisive Element of Context, 51 Vanderbilt
Law Review 763 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol51/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Humanitarian Regulation of
Hostilities: The Decisive Element
of Context
Geoffrey S. Corn*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

......................................
INTRODUCTION
REASONABLENESS AS A CONTEXTUAL CONCEPT ...........
COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS AND THE NATURE
OF DECENTRALIZED ATTACK DECISIONS .................
CLOSE COMBAT IN URBAN AREAS AND THE ROLE

763

....................................
........................................

777
784

OF FIRE SUPPORT
CONCLUSION

768
772

I. INTRODUCTION

War and human suffering have always been inextricably
intertwined. In the past century, the bulk of that suffering has shifted
from armed forces or other organized armed groups-those who
engage in hostilities-to civilians. As a 2001 article titled People on
War published by the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) noted:
Modern wars have become conflicts without limits. Civilians have-both
intentionally and by accident-been moved to center stage in the theater of
war, which was once fought primarily on battlefields. This fundamental shift in
the character of war is illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine
soldiers were killed for every civilian life lost. In today's wars, it is estimated
1
that ten civilians die for every soldier or fighter killed in battle.

Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston;
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), and formerly Special Assistant for Law of
War Matters and Chief of the Law of War Branch, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, United States Army; Chief of International Law for US Army Europe;
Professor of International and National Security Law at the US Army Judge Advocate
General's School. A special note of thanks to my research assistant, Joshua Beker,
South Texas College of Law Houston.
Stanley B. Greenberg & Robert 0. Boorstin, People on War: Civilians in the
1.
Line of Fire, PUB. PERSP., Nov.-Dec., 2001, at 18.
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While statistics vary among studies, there is no question that
beginning with World War II, the ratio of civilian to military
casualties in war has steadily increased. Many experts believe that
today 90 percent of casualties are civilian.2
It is therefore unsurprising, as well as critically important, that
international legal experts continue to focus on how international
humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict (LOAC), can best be
implemented and, in some cases, developed to mitigate the risks
civilians confront during war. However, it is equally critical that
these efforts are undertaken with a genuine appreciation for the
balance between military necessity and humanitarian constraints
that lies at the core of LOAC conflict regulation. The credibility and
efficacy of efforts to enhance civilian protections depend on such an
appreciation. 3 Ultimately, LOAC implementation will always be
enhanced when the rules align with military logic 4 and will be
stressed when combatants perceive the rules as attenuated from the
realities of the missions they must execute.

2.
See Graga Machel (Expert of the U.N. Secretary-General), Impact of Armed
Conflict on Children, ¶ 24, U.N Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1992); MARY KALDOR, NEW AND
OLD WARS: ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA 8 (1999); HOWARD ZINN, TERRORISM

AND WAR 78 (Anthony Arnove ed., 2002).
3.
See G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian
Populations in Armed Conflict, 1 3 (Dec. 9, 1970) ("In the conduct of military
operations, every effort should be made to spare the civilian populations from the
ravages of war, and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or
damage to civilian populations."); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 2.2.2.2,
5.2.3 (2016) (noting that parties to a conflict should comply with obligations in a
manner consistent with military necessity and take feasible precautions to reduce
harm to civilians); Matthew J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AM. UNIV. J. INTL L. & POLY 419, 426-27 (1987) ("We support the
principle that all practicable precautions, taking into account military and
humanitarian considerations, be taken in the conduct of military operations to
minimize incidental death, injury, and damage to civilians and civilian objects, and
that effective advance warning be given of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit.").

It is important to note, however, that legal compliance should not be considered the
only measure to mitigate civilian risk in the context of contemporary armed conflicts.
To the contrary, all efforts to reduce the incentive for nonstate armed groups to
gravitate towards urban and other densely populated areas should be pursued. This
must include more credible efforts to hold leaders of such groups accountable for
ordering or encouraging tactics that increase the risk to civilians, most notably the use
of civiluans an civilian property to shield their military assets from attack.
Additionally, states should seek to increase the effect of strategic messaging to
contribute to a more credible public discourse on the responsibility for civilian
casualties.
4.
See Geoffrey Corn, The Invaluable Civilian Risk Mitigation Contributionof
Recognizing the Value of Precautionary Measures (forthcoming 2018) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Corn, The Value of Precautionary Measures] (arguing that the
"prioritization of precautions as a critical targeting principle will often be better
aligned with instinctive military logic than the more amorphous proportionality rule").
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Successful LOAC implementation requires more than a general
recognition that military operational interests 5 must play a role in
defining what is and is not permissible civilian risk during
hostilities. 6 Instead, what is required is an understanding of the
relationship between the nature of military operations and the
concept of reasonableness-the common touchstone of compliance
with almost all LOAC targeting rules. 7 Unlike many other
humanitarian-oriented LOAC rules, such as rules related to the
9
protection of the wounded and sick,8 military medical facilities, or
10
conduct of hostilities rules rarely function in
prisoners of war,
absolute terms. Thus, unlike the absolute prohibition against
directing attacks against the wounded and sick rendered hors de
combat, most "targeting"-related civilian protection rules do not speak
in absolutes. Instead, they require assessment of competing
operational and humanitarian interests and a reasonable attack
judgment based on balancing these interests. Even the most absolute
of these rules, the distinction obligation," requires a prima facie
judgment of whether a person or object is or is not a military
objective.
Reasonableness is by its very nature context dependent: what
may be reasonable in one context may be completely unreasonable in
another.' 2 Preserving the fundamental logic of conduct of hostilities
rules therefore requires a constant emphasis on the relationship
between context and reasonableness. Nothing could be more corrosive
to the logic of reasonableness than the continued gravitation towards
"effects-based condemnations"1 3 based primarily-if not exclusively-

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
5.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] ("In order to ensure respect
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.").

The bulk of this is defined in Protocol I, supra note 5.
6.
Id. art. 57.
7.
See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
8.
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention II].
See Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 33.
9.
See generally Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
10.
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
11.
See Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 50.
For example, the destruction of a bridge that is heavily trafficked by
12.
military units would make it a reasonable military target. However, the same bridge
may not clearly be a target if it is only traveled by civilians.
See, e.g., Rep. of the Indep. Comm'n of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, ¶
13.
77, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/52 (June 24, 2005) (noting the Israel Defense Force's "use of
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on the infliction of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian
property. 14 Such an approach penalizes commanders 5 whose goodfaith efforts to implement civilian risk mitigation measures fail to
produce the desired outcome; 16 rewards commanders who disregard
civilian protection legal obligations yet produce outcomes that
fortunately do not manifest themselves in actual civilian harm;17
incentivizes enemy efforts to expose civilians to the risks of combat
and thereby increase the probability that friendly civilian risk
mitigation efforts will have minimal effect;' 8 and undermines respect
for the law by those entrusted with its implementation by creating an
unrealistic "zero-civilian casualty" expectation."
One need only consider a commander whose substantial and
good-faith efforts to mitigate civilian risk by complying with LOAC
targeting obligations fails to produce her desired outcome. It is simply
an unfortunate reality of war that such a delta between the intended
and actual outcome of an attack is sometimes unavoidable.
Condemning such a commander based on attack effects will
inevitably risk diluting respect for the law. Unless the commander is
judged based on the information reasonably available when the
attack decision was made, the law will be perceived as imposing a
strict liability standard; a standard that is attenuated from the
reality of warfare and therefore unrealistic and unattainable. This
may lead commanders to question the value of investing the time and
effort required to comply with the law.

artillery and other explosive weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated
areas") (emphasis added).

14.
See Philip Bump, War is Ugly: Kerry Defends Israel's Incursion into Gaza,
WASH.
POST
(July
20,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2014/07/20/war-is-ugly-kerry-defends-israels-incursion-intogaza/?utmterm=.d4397d1e98dc [https://perma.cc/9X3K-2Q7R] (archived Feb. 4, 2018).
15.
The term "commander" is used throughout this article to denote an
individual making a tactical decision to employ combat power. While this may often be
a person in a position of formal command, this will not always be the case.
16.
For example, U.S. commanders were condemned for accidentally killing
over two hundred Iraqi civilians by bombing a bunker that was covertly being used as a
shelter, even though they made a reasonable assessment that the target was valid and
would not expose civilians to unjustified risk. Indeed, the 1993 cruise missile strike on
the suspected headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service was carried out between 1
and 2 a.m. in order to prevent civilian harm. REUBEN E. BRIGATY II, ETHICS,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: CRUISE MISSILES AND US SECURITY
POLICY 130 (2007).

17.
For example, a commander who fails to consider any of their LOAC
responsibilities in carrying out an attack, but does not kill any civilians.
18.
See generally Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm'r for
Human Rights on the Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolutions S-9/1 and
S-12/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/80/Add.1 (Dec. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Human Shields
Report].
19.
See Rules Of Engagement Are A Dilemma For U.S. Troops, NPR (Dec. 11,
2009),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=121330893
[https://
perma.cclQGQ8-SBTJ] (archived Feb. 19, 2018) (discussing that the impact of General
Stanley McChrystal's rules of engagement on the decisions American troops).
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Nowhere are these risks of overlooking context in the assessment
of reasonableness more prevalent than in the relation to the type of
military operations falling within the general characterization of
"combined arms maneuver." These operations involve the
employment of the full spectrum of combat capabilities-what US
commanders call combined arms operations-to facilitate ground
operational missions. These combined arms ground maneuver
operations are usually conducted to "close with and destroy" enemy
units and gain control of enemy territory, even if only temporarily.
Ideally, such operations would occur in areas with little to no civilian
presence-the classic "force on force" engagement. But that ideal is
unrealistic today.
Today, isolated force-on-force battles are considered a relic of the
past. Instead, armed forces must expect to conduct combined arms
maneuver operations in and around civilians and civilian population
centers.2 0 And this expectation is only increased when anticipating
operations against enemies who see embedding their vital assets in
densely populated areas as a force multiplier. This perception is
based on not only the inherent tactical advantages of embedding
assets among civilian population centers (such as ready access to
logistics and lines of communication), but also their recognition that
the complexity of conducting operations against these assets in a
legally compliant manner will inhibit the efforts of their state
opponents. 21
All of this points towards the importance of a more
comprehensive understanding of targeting reasonableness-an
understanding based on the tactical situation that frames attack
decisions and the nature of the combat operation in which those
decisions are made. This latter aspect of assessing attack
reasonableness will be enhanced by considering not only whether an
attack decision is deliberate or dynamic/time-sensitive 2 2 but also the
impact of the "mission-type" 23 context of operations. As this Article
will explain, because operations conducted pursuant to mission-type
orders involve inherently decentralized attack decisions, the
expectation of what is or is not reasonable is different than in the
context of deliberate attack decisions. Because of this, those

20.
For example, targeting ISIS in Raqqa, Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon,
and Hamas in Gaza, or US attacks in Falluja.
See Human Shields Report, supra note 18, TT 31, 66.
21.
The dynamic or time-sensitive attack process sees military personnel,
22.
regardless of training in the LOAC, required to make a split second decision in the field
regarding a possible attack. They may be lacking in military intelligence or proper
understanding of the military objective, and have to act on a moment's notice. Strict
advice and planning under the LOAC is next to impossible.
The mission-type attack process relies on subordinate leaders at every
23.
level to exercise tactical initiative to collectively achieve a broadly defined commander's
intent.
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responsible for implementing LOAC obligations and assessing
compliance with these obligations should lead to a prioritization of
the rule of precautionary measures as the focal point for civilian risk
mitigation.

II. REASONABLENESS AS A CONTEXTUAL CONCEPT
Almost all LOAC experts agree that "reasonableness" is the
touchstone of compliance with judgment-based LOAC targeting
rules. 24 These rules frame the assessment of what qualifies as a
lawful military objective, what amounts to an indiscriminate attack
as the result of excessive civilian risk (commonly called the
proportionality rule),2 5 and when implementing certain enumerated
precautions in the attack is or is not feasible. 26 Compliance with each
of the LOAC rules ultimately turns on the objective reasonableness of
the assessment.
The notion of reasonableness as a legal standard has always
been related to the "reasonable man" concept.2 7 This standard is
central to assessing personal liability in the context of tort law,
criminal responsibility for crimes defined in terms of recklessness or
negligence, and many other areas of law, such as assessing
compliance with the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. In
all these contexts, reasonableness is the standard used to assess the
validity of individual judgments. This standard is inherently objective
in nature: Was the individual's judgment consistent with that which
would have been made by the hypothetical "reasonable person"?28
However, in all these contexts, reasonableness is assessed ex ante
based on the circumstances that existed at the time of the decision. 29

24.
,See Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Distinction, and the Long War: Guarding
against Conflation of Cause and Responsibility, 46 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 1 (2016)
[hereinafter Corn, Targeting] (stating that "military forces will always seek tactical
and operational advantages in the conduct of hostilities, and such advantage will often
be derived from tactics that rely on the use of civilian property or exploit proximity to
civilian population centers").
25.
Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
26.
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
27.
Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed
Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 437, 442 (2012) [hereinafter
Corn, Command Judgment].
28.
Id. See also John J. Merriam, Affirmative Target Identification:
Operationalizingthe Principleof Distinctionfor U.S. Warfighters, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 83,
129 (2016) (noting that "[r]easonableness is not a threshold; rather, it is an attribute of
decision-making that can be judged only in context. A targeting decision based on a
particular degree of certainty about a target may be entirely reasonable in one context,
but unreasonable in another.").
29.
See Merriam, supra note 28, at 129.
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Reasonableness has also been recognized as the essential
touchstone for compliance with LOAC targeting law.3 0 Thus,
commanders are expected to make reasonable judgments when
implementing the rules of distinction, proportionality, and when
assessing when certain civilian risk mitigation precautionary
measures are feasible. This standard is also central to the assessment
of individual responsibility pursuant to international criminal law
when a commander is alleged to have violated one or more of these
LOAC targeting obligations. 3
Context is equally critical to the LOAC reasonableness
assessment. This reasonableness touchstone is therefore by its very
nature dependent on the totality of the tactical and operational
considerations confronting the attack decision maker. No objective
test for compliance with a legal rule or principle can function
rationally if it is divorced from such context. While it is virtually
impossible to define-beyond the most blatant violations of targeting
rules-what is or is not reasonable in the abstract, how
reasonableness is assessed in any given attack situation has proven a
vexing dilemma. Indeed, in Prosecutorv. Gotivina,32 perhaps the most
significant international criminal trial implicating the reasonableness
of attack judgments, the Trial Chamber's effort to adopt a per se test
for when an attack becomes unreasonable (the now infamous "200
meter" rule) was rejected by the Appeals Chamber. While the per se
approach may have provided greater predictability in the
implementation of and accountability for the law related to attack
judgments, the Appeals Chamber was wise to recognize that the
inherent variables associated with such judgments necessitate a more
nebulous notion of reasonableness.3 3
As I argued in a prior article, 34 perhaps the most important
question related to implementation of LOAC targeting rules is the
quanta of information needed to render an attack judgment
reasonable. Without answering this question, the assessment of

30.

INT'L COMM.

OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY

PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977

1

ON THE ADDITIONAL

1931 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno

Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b), opened for
31.
signatureJuly 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002). Specifically,
the International Criminal Court statute prohibits directing an attack against civilians
or civilian property during an international armed confict (IAC); launching an attack
when the "perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects .. . and that such death, injury or damage would
be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated" during an IAC; or directing an attack against a
civilian or the civilian population during a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Id.
art. 8(2)(b)(iv)(3).
* 32.
Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 49
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012).
Id. ¶ 29.
33.
Corn, Command Judgment, supra note 27, at 441.
34.
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attack legality and, more importantly, imposition of criminal
responsibility for alleged unlawful attacks will remain inherently
arbitrary. Accordingly, I proposed an analogy to US search and
seizure jurisprudence, arguing that the nature of the tactical
situation should dictate a sliding scale of required information to
render an attack judgment reasonable.3 5 Other experts in the field
reject that approach, advocating instead that the generalized notion
of reasonableness is sufficient to account for the wide array of tactical
targeting situations.3 6 However, the common thread that runs
through both these approaches is the essential role of situational
context in the assessment of reasonableness.
Most LOAC experts agree with this: that a commander's
compliance with the law must be assessed based on the facts
reasonably available at the time.3 7 The "reasonably" qualifier to this
standard prevents a claim of immunity based on activity that
amounts to willful blindness-commanders may not deliberately or
even recklessly avoid reasonably available information in order to
justify what would be recognized by a reasonably diligent counterpart
as an unlawful attack.3 8 However, even when qualified .by this
"available information" principle, assessing what is or is not a
reasonable attack judgment is both highly contextual and highly
amorphous. Indeed, the inherent uncertainty associated with the
notion of attack reasonableness has, at least in the opinion of this
author, led to an increasingly common tendency to look to attack
effects as the dispositive indicator of LOAC compliance.3 9
I have called this phenomenon effects-based condemnation and
argued frequently that this tendency is fundamentally inconsistent
with the reasonableness touchstone of LOAC targeting law. 40 While
there is no question that attack effects are probative on the question
of whether a commander complied with the LOAC when the attack
judgment was made, effects can never be dispositive of this question.
Allowing this assessment trend to continue risks transforming the
standard of reasonableness into one of strict liability: commanders
will be condemned for decisions that were reasonable when made
whenever the effects of the attack inflict a level of civilian harm

35.
Id. at 460-94.
36.
See, e.g., Merriam, supra note 28, at 129; see also Gregory S. McNeal,
Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 738 (2014).
37.
Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 57; see also Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of
Proportionand the "ReasonableMilitary Commander"- Reflections on the Law, Ethics,
and Geopolitics of Proportionality,6 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 299 (2015).
38.
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, in 4 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N,
LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948).

39.
Corn, Targeting, supra note 24, at 21.
40.
See, e.g., Corn, The Value of PrecautionaryMeasures, supra note 4, at 3-4;
see also Geoffrey Corn, Attack Decision-Making: Context, Reasonableness, and the Duty
to Obey (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Corn, Attack DecisionMaking].

2018]

771

HUMANITARIAN REGULA TION OF HOSTILITIES

considered unacceptably high. This will not only be inherently
inequitable for the commander but also incentivize the worst
practices of belligerents who seek to exploit the presence of civilians
by deliberately exposing them to collateral consequences of attacks to
complicate enemy attack decisions. 4 1
It is understandable why the objective nature of the effects-based
approach to LOAC compliance assessment is so seductive: it is simply
easier (because it is based on publically available information) than
the far more nuanced method of the ex ante reasonableness
assessment (which often requires access to sensitive information).
Indeed, even those who recognize the dangers of effects-based
assessments and reject this trend must acknowledge that little
42
guidance exists on what factors should define this ex ante approach.
Ultimately, a "totality of the circumstances" methodology is probably
the best answer to this question. Perhaps the most common
articulation of this totality approach is found in the text of Additional
Protocol I's (AP I) military objective rule, which indicates that the
assessment of a military objective is based on "the circumstances
ruling at the time." Specifically, Article 52 provides:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstancesruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

43

Interestingly, the ICRC Commentary associated with this
provision of the Protocol provides no meaningful explanation of what
"circumstances" are relevant in this military objective assessment
equation. 44 Instead, it simply reaffirms that "circumstances" are
essential for making such an assessment. Nonetheless, as the rule is
focused on the ex ante decision-making process during combat
operations, it is only logical to assume that the relevant
circumstances include all aspects of the tactical situation the
commander confronts.
Hence, the common response to the question of what a
commander must consider when making the military objective
assessment, as well as assessments related to the implementation of
proportionality and precautions in the attack, is "the information

41.
42.
43.

See supranotes 16-21.
See generally Corn, Targeting, supranote 24.
Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 52.

44.

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 30, T 2037 ("[I]t

remains the case that the text adopted by the Diplomatic Conference largely relies on
the judgment of soldiers who will have to apply these provisions. It is true that there
are clear-cut situations where there is no possibility of doubt, but there are also
borderline cases where the responsible authorities could hesitate. In such
circumstances the general aim of the Protocol should be borne in mind.").
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reasonably available to the commander at the time." While this is
undoubtedly accurate, it is also undoubtedly underinclusive. Why?
Because it is not just the available information that frames the
assessment of reasonableness, but also the tactical and operational
context in which attack decisions are made. Understanding the
nature of a military operation will, in fact, provide the framework for
assessing when and how reasonably available information should
influence attack judgments. Unfortunately, as I have noted in a
forthcoming chapter, sixteen years of counterinsurgency operations
with attack decisions defined by a deliberative process with the
benefit of information dominance may be contributing to a false
expectation that attack decisions in all types of combat operations
involve an analogous quality of time, information, and deliberation. 45
Such a false expectation risks distorting credible legal analysis
almost as much as an effects-based approach. Instead, defining and
understanding what is or is not a reasonable attack judgment must
begin with an understanding of the nature of the combat operation in
which that judgment is nested.

III. COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS AND THE NATURE OF DECENTRALIZED
ATTACK DECISIONS

As noted above, recognizing that reasonableness is the genuine
touchstone of implementing the LOAC targeting rules is the starting
point, and not the end point, of effective implementation. Operational
context provides the essential foundation for assessing what is or
what is not reasonable. This is not to suggest the standard is
subjective. Indeed, it would nullify the protective intent of LOAC
targeting rules to allow commanders to simply decide by fiat what
does or does not qualify as a lawful attack. Furthermore,
accountability would be substantially compromised if the ultimate
question was not whether a commander made a reasonable decision
based on the circumstances prevailing at the time, but whether the
commander subjectively believed his decision was reasonable.
Instead, effective application of the reasonableness touchstone in
relation to the conduct of hostilities requires an understanding that
the objective critique must be based on the contextual perspective of
the commander at the time of the decision. Without considering such
context, commanders would be held to an unrealistic standard of
perfection. Framing the reasonableness assessment on prevailing
context, in contrast, demands of a commander that his judgment fall
within a range of appreciation consistent with that of the
hypothetical reasonable commander faced with the same situation.

45.

Corn, Attack Decision-Making, supra note 40.
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This contextual foundation for assessing reasonable targeting
decisions is central to the enumeration of the most important LOAC
targeting rules. As noted above, Article 52 of Additional Protocol I
enumerates the test for determining what qualifies as a military
objective and indicates that the assessment of anticipated military
advantage is based on the "circumstances ruling at the time" of the
military objective determination. 46 The International Committee of
the Red Cross Commentary to this provision also notes that "those
ordering or executing the attack must have sufficient information
available to take this requirement into account." 4 7 The
proportionality rule, enumerated in Article 51 of AP I, characterizes
as indiscriminate, and therefore prohibited, any "attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." 48 While the rule does not use the same "circumstances
ruling at the time" terminology of Article 52, the use of the term
"anticipated" indicates that application of the rule is inherently
predictive in nature. Such predictions-the anticipated civilian risk
and the anticipated military advantage-are obviously contingent on
reasonably available information, the essential foundation for the
objective reasonableness of the ultimate attack judgment.
Civilian risk mitigation precautionary measures, enumerated in
Articles 57 and 58, also indicate the critical role of context in their
implementation. 49 Several of the enumerated precautions are
contingent on feasibility, which requires consideration of a wide
range of contextual factors. Advance warnings are required unless
the "circumstances do not permit," indicating that an analogous range
of contextual considerations dictates the reasonableness of a decision
not to issue such warnings.5 0 Article 57 also includes its own version
of the proportionality rule, and like the enumeration in Article 51, the
inherently predictive nature of the assessment indicates that context
is decisive in its implementation.5 1 Furthermore, Article 57 imposes
an obligation on those executing an attack to "cancel or suspend" the
attack if, during execution, it becomes apparent that the attack will
result in a proportionality violation. 52 It is self-evident that what is or
is not apparent is totally context dependent. Similarly, Article 57
imposes an obligation to select the method or means of attack
resulting in the lowest degree of anticipated civilian risk when a
choice between multiple attack options offers the "same or similar

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 52.
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supranote 30,
Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 51(5)(b).
Id. art. 57.
Id.
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 30,
Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 57.
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military advantage."53 The comparison of multiple attack options for
assessing their relative equality of military advantage must depend
on the prevailing tactical and operational contexts.
Article 58 enumerates what are best understood as "passive"
precautionary measures, obligating commanders to mitigate the risk
that civilians will be victimized by enemy attack by avoiding, to the
maximum extent feasible, commingling of military assets among the
civilian population. 54 Furthermore, commanders are obligated to take
other necessary precautions to mitigate civilian risk, but again, this is
qualified by feasibility considerations. 5 5 What is or is not feasible is
not-and cannot be-defined, because of the obvious impact of
situational context.
Collectively, the central characteristic of these critical LOAC
targeting rules is that they do not lay down absolute prohibitions or
permissions.
Instead, the tactical and operational situation
confronted by the commander or other attack decision makers
provides the essential context for assessing when an attack, or action
that could expose civilians and civilian property to the risks of an
attack, is prohibited by these legal rules. Context, in turn, involves a
totality assessment of a range of considerations related both to
mission accomplishment and civilian risk. For US commanders, the
commonly
used
pneumonic
"METT-T-C"
summarizes
these
considerations: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and
Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations. U.S.
Army Doctrinal Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, explains the
critical role of such considerations in mission planning and execution:
Commanders and staffs use the operational and mission variables to help build
their situational understanding. They analyze and describe an operational
environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political,
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment,
and time (PMESII-PT). Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter
information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information
with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination
with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation
and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
56
available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

These mission variables, however, also indicate that the relevant
context for implementing LOAC targeting rules varies depending on
both the mission and the nature of the operation. Effective
implementation and credible critiques of military operations require
a constant awareness of this contextual element of LOAC compliance.

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. art. 58.
Id.

56.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ADP 5-0, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ¶ 18 (2012).
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At the implementation level, commanders should constantly assess
how compliance can best be effectuated in these varying operational
contexts. For example, during the conduct of deliberate attacks,
integrating competent legal advisors into the attack planning process
can play a significant role in ensuring integration of LOAC
considerations during course-of-action analysis and selection. In
contrast, a commander planning for a combined arms ground
maneuver operation cannot expect subordinates to have the
opportunity to vet attack decisions with legal advisors or even subject
them to the same type of deliberate course-of-action analysis that is
available in the deliberate attack process. Accordingly, commanders
must anticipate the nature of the attack decisions that subordinates
will be required to make in such a dynamic decision-making context,
and provide them with the tools they need to make these decisions
consistent with LOAC obligations.
It is therefore essential that the nature of maneuver operations,
or perhaps more precisely the nature of tactical use of force decisions
during maneuver operations, is considered in the reasonableness
equation. Unlike the type of deliberate and individualized attack
decisions that have come to define counterinsurgency and
counterterror military operations, attack decisions in the context of
combined arms maneuver warfare will be defined by decentralized
and dynamic action-the operational context that must impact
assessments of attack judgment reasonableness.
As I explain in greater detail in a forthcoming book chapter that
will be published by the Lieber Institute,57 combined arms maneuver
operations are normally conducted within the concept of "mission
command." Mission command, which evolved from the German
military concept of auftragstaktik,5 8 emphasizes decentralized tactical
decision making and encourages subordinate leaders to exercise
tactical initiative to achieve broadly defined command objectives. As
one author explains,
Mission command is a command approach that is based upon the exercise of
local initiative within the framework of command intent. This is enabled by an
appropriate delegation of authority and responsibility that allows subordinate
commanders the latitude to plan and conduct operations based upon their
understanding of the local situation. A number of authors have examined the
different command approaches that are available. At the heart of most of these
discussions is the key issue of the extent to which command authority is held

57.
Corn, Attack Decision-Making, supra note 40.
58.
The concept traces its roots back to the German concept of auftragstaktik,
which translates roughly to mission-type tactics. Auftragstaktik held all German
commissioned and noncommissioned officers dutybound to do whatever the situation
required, as they personally saw it. Thomas E. Ricks, An elusive command philosophy
9,
2011),
(Sept.
POL'Y
different command culture, FOREIGN
and a
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/09/an-elusive-command-philosophy-and-a-differentcommand-culture/ [https://perma.cc/64DC-CGXB] (archived Feb. 14, 2018).
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tightly at the organisational core or is delegated to subordinates as in mission
command. The former class of command approach is commonly referred to as
'centralised' and the latter 'decentralised'. Forces that have the capability to
adopt decentralised approaches, such as mission command, retain the
advantage in the contemporary operating environment owing to their ability to
adapt their tactical activities rapidly as situations evolve.

59

Accordingly, when military operations and, especially, combined
arms maneuver operations are conducted within the broad concept of
mission command pursuant to "mission-type orders," use of force
decisions will rarely take the form of the type of deliberative attack
decisions associated with what is commonly referred to as the
"targeting cell." Instead, these operations rely on subordinate leaders
at every level to exercise tactical initiative to collectively achieve a
broadly defined commander's intent. These subordinate leaders are
expected to synchronize the employment of the combined arms assets
they control in order to maximize the effect of these assets on the
enemy and accomplish the mission. At each ascending level of
command, the arsenal of available combat assets increases, but the
basic premise of mission command remains constant: reliance on
decentralized subordinate decisions to seize and maintain tactical
initiative, set the tempo of the battle, and bring the enemy into
submission. 60
Identifying
the, best approach to
implementing
LOAC
obligations, and assessing what qualifies as a lawful attack decision,
must obviously start with an understanding of this type of
operational context. The level at which the attack decision is made,
the time available to consider other attack options and to assess
proportionality, the availability of legal advice in the decision-making
process, and the perceived importance of seizing and maintaining
tactical initiative play vital roles in framing the reasonableness
assessment. 61 It is only logical that because each ascending level of
command will normally possess both expanded combat capability and
more comprehensive situational awareness, more should be expected
in terms of the accuracy of attack judgments and the opportunity to
mitigate civilian risk through implementation of feasible precautions.
However, because execution of maneuver operations in the context of
mission command relies so heavily on initiative by small unit leaders,
what is or is not reasonable during mission execution will necessarily
result in different margins of appreciation depending on operational

59.
Keith G. Stewart, The Evolution of Command Approach 1, 2 (Def. Research
and Dev. Can. Toronto, Paper No. 192, 2010).
60.
For an overview and explanation of targeting doctrine and its relationship
to LOAC implementation, see generally Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of
OperationalTargeting: Viewing the LOAC through an OperationalLens, 47 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 337 (2012).
See generally Corn, Command Judgment, supra note 27.
61.
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context. That margin may therefore be wider at lower levels of
tactical execution. Just as it is unrealistic to expect the same level of
accuracy between deliberate and dynamic attack judgments, it is
equally unrealistic to demand the same level of attack judgment
accuracy at lower command levels than what is normally expected
from higher command levels, especially in the context of mission-type
operations.
Perhaps this merely confirms that it is probably impossible to
define with any degree of certainty conditions that render an attack
decision reasonable or unreasonable. Because context is so central to
this assessment, the law must accept this inherent uncertainty.
Nonetheless, understanding the operational context of decisionmaking can contribute to more credible implementation of the law.
First, such understanding will contribute to command assessment of
how to best prepare subordinate forces for the challenge of
implementing LOAC obligations. For example, in the mission
command context, it may be unrealistic to expect the proportionality
rule to bear the s'ame weight for complex dynamic attack decisions as
it can bear for deliberate information dominant attack decision
contexts.
Accordingly, a commander may logically choose to prioritize
other civilian risk mitigation measures, such as placing a greater
emphasis on the importance of precautions in the attack. Second,
such understanding will inevitably enhance the credibility of
critiques of attack decisions by informing those critiques with the
true nature of the operational context in which those decisions were
made. This will almost certainly make the assessment of attack
decision legality more complex and more challenging than simply
focusing on attack effects. This will also mean that there will be many
situations where it is simply impossible to reach anything close to
certitude on the question of attack decision legality. However,
integrating an understanding of operational context into the
assessment process will ultimately render condemnations of attack
judgments more credible, which will ideally lead to enhanced respect
for the law. Quite simply, the most influential critiques of military
operations will be those that are embraced as credible by
commanders who are genuinely committed to LOAC compliance.
Integrating a genuine understanding of operational context into such
critiques will inevitably contribute to such credibility.

IV. CLOSE COMBAT IN URBAN AREAS AND THE ROLE OF FIRE SUPPORT

How the assessment of reasonableness is distorted by the failure
to consider the operational context of attack decisions is illustrated by
the contemporary debate over the legality of using fire support assets
(what the ICRC labels as weapons with "wide area effects") in urban.

778

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL.51:763

or built-up areas. 6 2 Such weapons may be employed in both direct fire
mode-such as the use of a tank's main gun or a shoulder-fired
missile-or in an indirect fire mode-such as the use of mortars,
artillery, or rockets. When used in urban areas, the destructive
impact of these weapon systems almost always implicates the full
spectrum of LOAC targeting rules: Is the attack directed against a
lawful military objective? Will the use of the high explosive weapon
have an indiscriminate effect? Will the anticipated risk to civilians
and civilian property violate the proportionality rule? Are there
feasible alternatives or other precautionary measures that will
mitigate civilian risk?6 3 While assessing compliance with these
targeting rules is undoubtedly complicated when such weapons are
employed in urban areas, why they are employed, and the operational
context in which they are employed, are essential considerations in
the compliance equation.
The most comMon criticism leveled against the use of such
weapon systems in urban areas is that the harm to civilians and
destruction of civilian property they inflict renders them inherently
indiscriminate. 6 4
Unfortunately,
these
criticisms
are
often
quintessential examples of the type of effects-based condemnations
that distort the proper and intended function of LOAC targeting
rules. Relying primarily on the images of physical destruction to
civilian buildings and infrastructure, and of civilian casualties, critics
are all too quick to simply assume that the party to the conflict
responsible for attacks that cause such harm must be in willful
violation of international law. 65 However, such critiques fail to
adequately consider the military necessity side of the legality
equation, or the nature of the combat operations that result in such
destruction and harm. Even the prima facie assumption that the
property damaged was civilian, and the persons harmed were
immune from attack, is never as simple as these critiques suggest.
Instead, a civilian object will often qualify as a lawful military

62.
See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK 188 (2009); see also

Geoffrey Corn & James A. Schoettler, Jr., Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: The
Essential Role of Precautionary Measures, 223 MIL. L. REV. 785 (2015); Eric Talbot
Jensen, PrecautionsAgainst the Effects of Attacks in Urban Areas, 98 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 147 (2016).
63.
See Int'l Law Assoc. Study Grp. on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st
Century, The Conduct of Hostilities and InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Challenges
of 21st Century Warfare, 93 INT'L L. STUD. 322 (2017).
64.
See Stephen Townley, Indiscriminate Attacks and the Past, Present, and
Future of the Rules/Standards and Objective/Subjective Debates in International
HumanitarianLaw, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1223, 1260 (2017).
65.
Sara Almukhtar, U.S. Airstrikes on ISIS Have Killed Hundreds, Maybe
Thousands of Civilians, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/05/25/world/middleeast/airstrikes-iraq-syria-civilian-casualties.htm
[https://perma.cc/8FJK-HZQ6] (archived Feb. 1, 2018).
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objective in the midst of urban warfare, and individuals who appear
to be civilians by virtue of their dress may have in fact been lawful
objects of attack, either because they were members of armed groups
who failed to wear distinctive uniforms or because they were civilians
directly participating in hostilities. Furthermore, it will often be the
case that what appears after the fact as a civilian object was actually
a military objective when it was subjected to attack, especially when
fighting an adversary that deliberately embeds military assets in
civilian contexts so as to avoid detection or attack.
Nonetheless, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks
certainly includes a range of employment considerations that are
especially implicated by indirect fire assets, especially when
employed during urban operations. Specifically, Article 51 of AP I
includes within the definition of a prohibited indiscriminate attack:
(a)

Those which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b)

Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or

(c)

Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or
distinction.
objects
without
civilian

(a)

An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing
a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and

(b)

An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
66
advantage anticipated.

Ultimately, the relationship between fire support attacksespecially indirect fires, civilian harm, and the prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks-deserves careful and reasoned analysis and
inquiry. This need for such reasoned analysis is perhaps most acute
in the urban operations context, precisely because of the operational
and humanitarian stakes involved.
Accordingly, rejecting an effects-based approach to critiquing
attack decisions in no way mitigates the importance of careful and
credible assessments of whether the employment of high explosive
fires in urban operations runs afoul of these restrictions. For
example, what weapon systems are so inherently imprecise as to

66.

Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 51.
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violate the prohibition against using weapons that cannot be directed
at a specific military objective? Using obvious examples, such as a
SCUD missile that can only be directed at a very general geographic
area such as a city, is of limited utility if the ultimate goal is to align
the prohibition against indiscriminate attack with the specific nature
of urban operations. No credible interpretation of the law would
consider such an imprecise weapon as sufficiently discriminate to
qualify as lawful. But at what point does the range of probability of
hitting a specific target become too broad? And should this test itself
be contextual, resulting in a more restrictive definition in relation to
the potential risk to civilians? In other words, is the assessment of
this question unitary, or does the nature of urban operations
necessitate a different conclusion when a weapon system is employed
in that context?
Implementation of the proportionality component of the
prohibition against indiscriminate attack when employing direct and
indirect high explosive fires in urban areas is equally complex.
Central to this complexity is how military advantage should be
calculated and what qualifies as "excessive" civilian risk. 6 7 These
questions deserve special attention in the urban operations context.
For example, how valuable is the military advantage derived from the
ability to avoid close combat in urban terrain by employing fires as an
alternate to maneuver, or using fires to facilitate rapid maneuver
during such operations? And in this context specifically, is mitigation
of civilian risk and protection of civilian property and infrastructure
itself an aspect of military advantage, and if so, how does that
influence the proportionality balance? And should the proportionality
equation factor in only direct effects on the civilian population? Or
should, as the ICRC has suggested, "reverberating" effects impact the
proportionality assessment?
These are important questions in any operational context, but
their importance seems elevated when assessing LOAC compliance
during urban operations. There is, therefore, no doubt that these and
other related questions deserve careful inquiry. However, no matter
how determined the effort of such inquiry may be to find a "solution"
to the "problem" of civilian suffering associated with urban
operations, the blunt reality may be that the answer to the question
of where, when, and how high explosive fires may lawfully be
employed in urban areas may ultimately be "it depends." Why?
Because that answer must turn on the question of what qualifies as a

67.
See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOcOLS, supra note 30, $ 2216
(stating that "[the proportionality rule] provides for the punishment of those who
willfully launch an indiscriminate attack gravely affecting the civilian population in
the knowledge that such attack will cause loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects, when such loss, injury or damage is excessive in the sense of this
provision.").
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reasonable judgment of attack legality, and answering that question
is, as noted above, so inherently contextual that it may defy simple
per se rules.
Unfortunately, the complexity of assessing the legality of
employing fires in urban areas seems to have produced increasing
momentum for imposition of just such a per se solution. The
motivation for such efforts is not only obvious, but understandable:
protect civilians from the devastation of high explosive fires in urban
areas. Images from war-torn areas like Raqqa, Gaza, Mosul, Donestk,
and other urban battlefields are unquestionably emotionally
evocative. And the devastation from such combat cannot be
downplayed. However, proposing a ban on fires as the solution to the
humanitarian suffering associated with such combat is truly akin to
proposing the solution to a math equation without knowing a critical
component of the equation: "one plus I don't know equals ten."
Whether fires are reasonably necessary and reasonably employed in
any operational context, including during urban operations, turns on
not only the destructive effect of fires but also, the nature of the
military objective, the time and resources available to the commander
to achieve the objective, and the reasonably available alternatives to
the use of fires.68
The zeal to ban or restrict high explosive fires in urban areas
suffers from an insufficient understanding of the -nature of such
operations. Contrary to effects-based perceptions, professional armed
forces do not employ such weapons in urban or populated areas
casually. Instead, civilian risk mitigation should constantly temper
the assessment of tactical benefit derived from such use.69 Indeed, as
Kenneth Watkin has noted, and as is reflected in US military
doctrine, in many operations civilian risk mitigation will actually
itself be considered a military advantage.70 Use of high explosive fires
during such operations should, and ideally will, be measured and
based on credible assessments of military necessity. And, in the
urban operations context, this necessity will often be substantial, as
fires provide not only critical support for ground maneuvers but also
may often offer the commander the option to forego the use of ground
maneuvers altogether.
These necessity considerations are magnified in the context of
mission command. The traditional doctrinal aversion to ground
maneuvers in urban terrain indicates that commanders tasked with
executing the broad objectives of a given mission will instinctively
seek to avoid the urban environment. Alternatively, if compelled to
engage the enemy in such areas, commanders will use fires to

See Corn, Command Judgment, supranote 27, at 476.
68.
See generally Kenneth Watkin, Military Advantage: A Matter of "Value,"
69.
Strategy and Tactics, 17 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 277, 289 (2014).
70.
See id.
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minimize friendly exposure to the risks inherent in such maneuvers.
Fires provide commanders at every level with the opportunity .to
facilitate this avoidance by leveraging these weapons to produce a
range of beneficial effects: to disrupt the enemy's use of urban
terrain; to screen friendly forces maneuvering in or near urban
terrain; to fix enemy forces in the urban area; and to destroy high
value enemy targets in the urban area.7 1 When these effects may be
achieved without resort to ground maneuvers and close combat in the
urban environment, commanders exercising tactical initiative will
logically gravitate to this option. Even when the situation compels
resort to ground maneuvers in urban terrain, the dynamic nature of
the tactical situation, which will often involve confronting an enemy
with the defensive advantages derived from the urban environment,
makes the availability of fires an important component of successful
maneuvers.
I This very general observation about the potential tactical and
operational value of fires in urban areas merely reinforces the reality
that it is the operational situation that dictates the necessity of
employing combined arms capabilities. What military commanders
understand is that when they are confronted with the necessity of
dealing with an enemy embedded in urban terrain, the use of ground
maneuvers will often be the most destructive tactical option. Such
operations subject both friendly forces and civilians to immense risk,
risk that may often actually be mitigated by the use of fire support
either to avoid the need for ground maneuvers, or to facilitate such
maneuvers when necessary.
However, what is often lost in the debate over the role of fires in
this equation (in addition to exhibiting a failure to comprehend the
vital and oftentimes irreplaceable nature of these means), is that
banning or restricting their use will not alter the necessity of
achieving tactical effects when the enemy compels action in urban
environments. In fact, such efforts will likely produce the perverse
effect of incentivizing enemy use of such areas to gain tactical and
strategic advantage. This advantage results from two almost
inevitable consequences of forcing decisive action in this environment.
First, enemy forces-often less capable than their opponents-gain a
natural defensive advantage from the cover, concealment,
maneuverability, and access to resources in urban terrain. Second, by
increasing the perception of indifference to civilians resulting from
the destructive effects of urban combat, the enemy is able to exploit
the civilian population in the knowledge that the infliction of
casualties and the destruction of civilian property will undermine the
legitimacy of the legitimate opponent's efforts. 72

71.
See HENDERSON, supra note 62, at 187-88.
72.
See Human Shields Report, supra note 18, ¶ 31 (referring to the actions of
Hamas using civilians human shields as strategic deterrent from Israeli attacks); see
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Ignoring this tactical and operational context inevitably
attenuates the legality assessment from the reality of combat
operations. It might be tempting to simply respond that such is the
price of legal regulation, and that this means that combat operations
must conform to whatever the law demands. Of course this is true,
but such an approach to LOAC evolution would be unfortunate. The
resilience of this law has always been linked to the logical
relationship between the legitimate dictates of military necessity and
the equally legitimate need to mitigate, as much as is feasible, the
suffering caused by armed conflict.7 3 This highlights the historic and
constant challenge of LOAC implementation and, especially, the
challenge of convincing armed forces and other organized armed
groups of the value of compliance. The persuasive impact of the law is
ultimately contingent on that linkage, which means the persuasive
impact of the law is diminished whenever those responsible for
implementing the law perceive attenuation between the law's
demands and the legitimate interests of military necessity. Careful
attention to this reality will prevent corrosion of confidence in the law
and contribute positively to the already significant challenge of
persuading armed forces to embrace the law's humanitarian
constraints.
This does not mean that commanders are somehow licensed to
engage in indiscriminate attacks, or that the law should tolerate
indifference to civilian risk. Far from it. Instead, it means that
commanders must shift their compliance efforts from the deliberate
targeting context to a context where they must rely on junior leaders
as the implementation focal point. This in turn should drive an
honest assessment of how to best prioritize the LOAC's civilian risk
mitigation targeting rules so that the civilian risk mitigation effect of
the totality of the LOAC's regulatory regime is maximized.
This latter point necessitates a prioritization of effort in relation
to LOAC targeting rules. As I have noted previously, the
on the
so substantially
to focus
tendency
contemporary

also STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 73-76
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proportionality rule might be distracting focus from the more
important civilian risk mitigation rule of precautions. This is most
acute in the context of mission-type maneuver operations. The
inherent uncertainty of what does or does not violate the
proportionality rule renders its relevance minimal in the context of
such operations. Outside of the extreme scenarios, it is simply
unrealistic to expect junior combat leaders to engage in the type of
nuanced proportionality assessments that are difficult even in the
context of a deliberative, high-level targeting process. The pace of
operations and the perceived imperative of mission accomplishment
will make it especially difficult for such leaders to engage in the type
of sophisticated deliberative process associated with proportionality
implementation.
In contrast, the goal of civilian risk mitigation becomes more
realistic when combat leaders are trained from inception to
constantly seek out and exploit civilian risk mitigation measures
when those measures do not meaningfully compromise tactical
effect. 74 While the assessment of feasibility in relation to
precautionary measures does involve contextually driven judgments,
the overall concept of precautions is simply more objective than the
concept of proportionality.7 5 For example, balancing the civilian risk
mitigation benefit of modifying the methods, means, or timing of
attack against the tactical consequence of such modification is a
process that is more aligned with the decentralized decision-making
model of mission command than is balancing anticipated military
advantage against anticipated civilian risk. A decision to attack from
a different direction, or to use a weapon with a smaller blast effect, or
to delay attack to a more beneficial time, can be made in a timesensitive environment by junior combat leaders without the benefit of
legal advice. If this precautionary mentality is prioritized as the focal
point of LOAC compliance during mission-type operations, it will
ultimately increase the probability of an effective balance between
military necessity and humanity.

V. CONCLUSION

Credible critiques of the legality of military operations must be
informed not only by expertise in the law but also by an appreciation
for the nature of the military operation being assessed. This latter
aspect of the equation includes not only the obvious aspects of
friendly and enemy situations but also an understanding of how the
very nature of a given military operation impacts how the LOAC is
implemented. In the context of mission command, this then

74.
75.

Corn, The Value of PrecautionaryMeasures, supra note 4, at 6.
See Int'l Law Ass'n Study Grp., supra note 63, at 372.
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illuminates the true nature of the vast majority of use of force
decisions: decentralized, dynamic, and often made by junior combat
leaders with little or no opportunity for legal vetting. Understanding
how this context frames the assessment of reasonableness is acute in
relation to urban operations, as this tactical context produces
significant use of force and civilian protection complexities that,
unfortunately, are often exploited by illicit armed forces and
organized armed groups. In short, it is itself illegitimate to ignore this
operational context when purporting to offer a legitimate assessment
of LOAC reasonableness.
Instead, both commanders responsible for implementing the law
and those engaged in assessing and critiquing legal compliance
during combat operations should orient their efforts by viewing
implementation through the lens of the mission command operational
context. This focus will inevitably be somewhat different than the
focus for compliance in relation to individualized deliberate targeting.
In the latter context, the more centralized nature of attack decisions,
coupled with the availability of time, information, legal advice, and a
wide array of attack options, should inform the assessment of
reasonableness. Because these factors are fundamentally different in
the context of operations conducted pursuant to mission-type orders,
the margin of appreciation for what qualifies as a reasonable attack
judgment-to include the decision to employ various combat
capabilities-is necessarily expanded.
Decision-making reasonableness cannot be divorced from
context. While reasonableness is ultimately an objective assessment,
failing to consider the specific context of a given decision will
inevitably undermine the credibility of such assessments. LOAC
targeting rules reflect this essential relationship. However, what is
not always recognized is that context extends beyond the aspects of
time, enemy, terrain, etc. Relevant context includes the nature of the
military operation, which should be understood not only in terms of
deliberate versus dynamic/time-sensitive targeting but also in terms
of centralized individualized attack operations and decentralized
mission command type operations. This ideally will result in a more
"mission-focused" prioritization of LOAC civilian risk mitigation
rules, better prepare junior combat leaders to address the civilian
risk challenges of mission execution, and result in more credible
critiques of attack judgments in these complex operational
environments.

